DOCKSIDE DONNYBROOK DOES NOT CONFER ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

In a very recent decision, Tandon v Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 214 US App. LEXIS 9265 (2nd Cir. Con. May 19, 2014), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the test for admiralty jurisdiction established by the US Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart v Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 US 527 (1995) holding that tort claims arising from a fist fight on a permanent floating dock do not fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.  In Grubart, the Supreme Court enunciated a two part test which must be satisfied before admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised over tort claims: “A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC §1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water.  The connection test raises two issues.  A court, first, must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.  Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.”

In Tandon, a fist fight broke out between the occupants of a recreational vessel and a water taxi on and around a floating dock surrounded by navigable water, but permanently secured to the bottom of a harbor.  One of the individuals involved in the altercation allegedly suffered serious injuries as a result of being physically held under water to the point of asphyxia.  The victim initiated an action in Connecticut State Court against the owners and operators of the marina and owners and operators of the recreational vessel whose occupants were involved in the altercation.  The owners and operators of the recreational vessel then filed a Petition for Limitation of Liability in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.  The Petition is a form of relief specific to admiralty and maritime cases, and is commonly cited by Jones Act lawyers where needed.  46 USC §30505(a) provides that “the liability of an owner of a vessel for any claim, debt or liability [covered by the Act] shall not exceed the value of the vessel and pending freight.”  Pursuant to the statute, the owner of a vessel can seek to limit its liability to the value of the vessel at the time of the incident by commencing an action in the United States District Court.  46 USC §30511(a).  Although the Limitation of Liability Act provides a federal cause of action for a vessel owner seeking exoneration or limitation, it does not provide an independent basis for federal admiralty jurisdiction. The fact that a vessel owner may file a Petition for Limitation does not mean that the district court necessarily has jurisdiction to hear it.  Instead, the district court will only have admiralty jurisdiction to hear a Petition for Limitation if it already has admiralty jurisdiction over the underlying claims that the Petition seeks to limit.

At the district court level, one of the claimants filed a motion to dismiss the Petition asserting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  The district court agreed applying the jurisdictional analysis laid out in Grubart and held that the alleged torts at issue failed both the “location” test and the “connection” test for federal admiralty jurisdiction.  It held that the location test was not met because the altercation which formed the basis for the claims occurred on a floating dock which was properly considered an extension of land because it was permanently fixed in location.  It also held that the connection test was not met because the type of incident involved did not have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.  The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision holding that the District Court properly declined to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the matter, and upholding the dismissal of the Petition for Limitation of Liability for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Although the Second Circuit considered the location test, it declined to determine what appeared to be a rather slippery question as to whether the location test was satisfied, moving directly to the connection test.  The Court concluded that the incident at issue in the case “a physical altercation among recreational visitors on or around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable water did not realistically pose a threat to maritime commerce and could not lead to a disruption in the course of the waterway itself.  Specifically a fist fight on a dock cannot immediately damage nearby commercial vessels.”  The Court took caution to narrowly restrict its holding indicating “the class of incidents we consider here includes only fights on permanent docks – that is, docks that are connected in a permanent fashion to the land underneath or beside navigable water, and that do not move relative to the shore (except perhaps by rising and falling with tide).  This type of incident does not pose the same risk to maritime commerce as a fist fight occurring on a vessel on navigable water.” Further, “the class of incidents we consider here involves only physical altercations among recreational visitors, not persons engaged in maritime employment.  This type of incident therefore cannot have a potential effect on maritime commerce by injuring those who are employed in maritime commerce.”

In conclusion, the Court summarized stating: “in developing the modern test for admiralty tort jurisdiction, the Supreme Court “aimed at keeping a…class of odd cases out.””